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Who Enforces China’s Anti-corruption Laws? 
Recent Reforms of China’s Criminal 
Prosecution Agencies and the Chinese 
Communist Party’s Quest for Control 
LYRIC CHEN* 
ABSTRACT 
As Chinese President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign contin-
ues to generate a staggering number of investigations, the institutions that 
conduct enforcement and the process of enforcement deserve closer ex-
amination.  This article examines the People’s Procuratorate, the Com-
mission for Disciplinary Inspection, and the Ministry of Supervision, 
with an emphasis on the People’s Procuratorate–the public prosecutor–
and the 2014 reforms of the agency.  An analysis of the process of anti-
corruption enforcement shows that the People’s Procuratorates have a 
tenuous role in supervising the Party.  Following the 2014 reforms, which 
enhanced the capacity and investigatory powers of the People’s Procura-
torates, in 2016, the Party approved limits on prosecutorial initiative in 
anti-corruption investigation.  These reforms and subsequent retrench-
ment underscore the Party’s continuing control over the anti-corruption 
prosecutors; they also reinforce the view that China’s legal system re-
mains formalistic and that the Party continues to operate beyond the rule 
of law.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Beyond the staggering numbers of investigations conducted and in-
dividuals punished,1 China’s current anti-corruption campaign is a case 
study of institutional cooperation and competition.  This article examines 
the process of enforcement and the institutions that undertake enforce-
ment—the People’s Procuratorate, the Commission for Disciplinary In-
spection, and the Ministry and Bureaus of Supervision—with an empha-
sis on the People’s Procuratorate, the public prosecutor in China. 
Since the late 1980s, when China embarked on a series of economic 
and political reforms, corruption has become prevalent, high-stakes, and 
large scaled.2  Bribe-taking is particularly common,3 and corrupt transac-
tions are increasingly complex and networked.4  Given the intensification, 
Chinese leaders have voiced concern over corruption, acknowledging to 
varying degrees that corruption leads to arbitrary policies and govern-
ment actions that could distort entrepreneurial decision making, reduce 
public confidence in government, and generate social unrest.5  Ultimately, 
however, their concerns focus on the detrimental effect of corruption on 
the legitimacy of the ruling power of the Chinese Communist Party.6 
In the decades that followed, successive administrations have 
sought to crackdown on this conduct.7  In the current anti-corruption cam-
paign, which began in November 2012, when Xi Jinping assumed the 
position of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party,8 the Party 
has investigated over 500,000 Party officials for corruption-related of-
fenses and levied punishment against over 63,000 officials.9  Over 
 
 1. See Huaxia, Xinhua, China Enhances Crackdown on Corruption: Reports, XINHUANET 
(Mar. 12, 2015), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/12/c_134059857.htm. 
 2. Andrew Wedeman, The Intensification of Corruption in China, 180 CHINA QUARTERLY 
895, 895 (2005). 
 3. Yong Guo, Corruption in Transitional China: an Empirical Analysis, 194 CHINA 
QUARTERLY 349, 357 (2008). 
 4. Ting Gong, Dangerous Collusion: Corruption as a Collective Venture in Contemporary 
China, 35 COMMUNIST & POST-COMMUNIST STUDIES 85, 85 (2002). 
 5. See DALI L. YANG, REMAKING THE CHINESE LEVIATHAN: MARKET TRANSITION AND 
THE POLITICS OF GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 221, 257 (2004); YASHENG HUANG, SELLING CHINA: 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT DURING THE REFORM ERA 33, 112 (2003). 
 6. See generally YANG, supra note 5, at 220–21. 
 7. Daniel C.K. Chow, How China’s Crackdown on Corruption Has Led to Less Transpar-
ency in the Enforcement of China’s Anti-Bribery Laws, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV., 685, 690 (2015). 
 8. News of the Communist Party of China, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Mar. 29, 2013), 
http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206976/8188031.html; Xi Jinping Named President of 
China, BBC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-21766622. 
 9. Andrew Wedeman, Analysis, Four Years On: Where is Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption 
Drive Headed?, CHINA POL’Y INST. (Sept. 19, 2016), https://cpianalysis.org/2016/09/19/four-
years-on-where-is-xi-jinpings-anti-corruption-drive-headed; Chow, supra note 7, at 696. 
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roughly the same period, the People’s Procuratorates have indicted over 
120,000 officials, of which 100,200 have been convicted.10  Although the 
People’s Procuratorates have at times competed with the Commissions 
for Disciplinary Inspection, more recently, the People’s Procuratorates 
have acquiesced to Party control over the enforcement process.  This ac-
quiescence has consequences not only for enforcement outcomes, but 
also the authoritativeness and legitimacy of the enforcement process.   
This article argues the process of anti-corruption enforcement pro-
vides insight into the prospects of the development of rule of law in 
China.  The recent series of reforms, including the creation of a new anti-
corruption unit in the People’s Procuratorates in 2014 and the curtailment 
of their power in 2016,11 confirms that, despite the country’s rapid legal 
development in the past few decades, its legal system remains formalistic, 
and the Party continues to exert control over criminal justice institutions 
and resist checks on its power.  The rest of this article proceeds in three 
parts.  Section II provides an overview of the institutions engaged in en-
forcement.  Section III analyzes the process of enforcement and the extent 
to which the People’s Procuratorates compete and cooperate with the 
Commissions on Disciplinary Inspection.  Section IV examines recent 
reforms of the People’s Procuratorates and their implications. 
II. ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTIONS   
China’s anti-corruption agencies and the dynamics among them 
should be considered in the context of an institutional arrangement that 
promotes the dominance of the Chinese Communist Party over the gov-
ernment.12  At every level, from village or township to the national level, 
there is a Chinese Communist Party committee and a government entity.13  
At each level, the Party committee outranks the government entity.14  
Consistent with this structure, there are both Party and state agencies 
 
 10. Wedeman, supra note 9.   
 11. Decision on Carrying Out Pilot Projects of the National Procurator System, GEN. OFFICE 
OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY’S CENT. COMMITTEE (Nov. 6, 2016), http://www.chi-
nalawtranslate.com (passed by the 25th Session of the Standing Committee of the 12th National 
People’s Congress on Dec. 25, 2016); General Office of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central 
Committee Issues “Decision on Carrying Out Pilot Projects of the National Procurator System,” 
XINHUA (Nov. 7, 2016), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-11/07/c_1119867301.htm. 
 12. See generally Chow, supra note 7. 
 13. Susan V. Lawrence, China’s Political Institutions and Leaders in Charts, 
CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERVICE 4 (Nov. 12, 2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43303.pdf. 
 14. Id. 
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charged with anti-corruption enforcement.15  The Commission for Disci-
plinary Inspection is the anti-corruption authority for the Chinese Com-
munist Party and enforces Party rules.16  The Ministry of Supervision is 
the counterpart for the Chinese government, and has jurisdiction where 
conduct is covered by administrative law or rules.17  The People’s Procu-
ratorate provides “legal supervision” and has jurisdiction where conduct 
violates criminal law.18  This section provides an overview of these insti-
tutions, beginning with and focusing on the People’s Procuratorates. 
A. The People’s Procuratorates 
In 1954, the National People’s Congress adopted China’s first Con-
stitution and the Organic Law of the People’s Procuratorate.19  The laws 
established the People’s Procuratorate as the office of the public prose-
cutor, and authorized the agency to prosecute conduct proscribed by law 
and conduct “legal supervision” of state organs.20  The laws also provided 
for the creation of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, local People’s 
Procuratorates at each level of the party-state, and special procuratorates, 
such as military and railroad procuratorates.21  In the party-state structure, 
the Supreme People’s Procuratorate reports to the National People’s Con-
gress and its standing committee.22  At subnational levels, the local Peo-
ple’s Procuratorates report to their respective local People’s Congress and 
its standing committee. 
 
 15. Stephen K. Ma, The Dual Nature of Anti-Corruption Agencies in China, 49 CRIM. L. SOC. 
CHANGE, 153, 154 (2008). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 155; State Structure of the People’s Republic of China, The National People’s Con-
gress of the People’s Republic of China, available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/stateStruc-
ture/2007-12/06/content_1382077.htm (last visited July 31, 2017). 
 19. Hexing Shi, The People’s Congress System and China’s Constitutional Development, in 
CHINA’S POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: CHINESE AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 103, 107 (Kenneth 
G. Lieberthal, Cheng Li, & Keping Yu, eds., 2014); Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 
HUM. RTS. IN CHINA, http://www.hrichina.org/en/1954-constitution-peoples-republic-china. 
 20. Taking Stock of the Anti-Corruption Process: Five Steps from Discovery to Disposition, 
S. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2013/08-31/5229401.shtml. 
 21. Introduction of the People’s Procuratorate of the People’s Republic of China, THE 
SUPREME PEOPLE’S CT. OF CHINA, http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=44 (last visited 
Aug. 16, 2016). 
 22. State Structure of the People’s Republic of China, THE NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONGRESS OF 
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/stateStructure/2007-
12/06/content_1382077htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2016). 
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The functions of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate are carried out 
by departments.23  Some departments oversee aspects or phases of prose-
cution.  For example, the investigation supervision department oversees 
arrests and investigations conducted by local People’s Procuratorates; the 
public prosecution department provides guidance on and supervises de-
cisions to indict or appeal, the trying of cases by local People’s Procura-
torates, and even the conduct of criminal proceedings by local People’s 
Courts.24  Other departments supervise the prosecution of certain types of 
offenses.  For instance, until the reforms in late 2014, further discussed 
below, departments separately supervised the prosecution of various cat-
egories of corrupt conduct, such as embezzlement, bribery, dereliction of 
duty, and infringement of rights by officials.25 
The People’s Procuratorates were shut down during the Cultural 
Revolution, which took place from 1966 to 1976, and were revived in 
1978.26  In 1979, the National People’s Congress passed the Criminal Pro-
cedure Law, which provided the People’s Procuratorates ample investi-
gatory powers and few restrictions in their exercise.27  For example, the 
People’s Procuratorates could use a variety of tactics, such as subpoenas, 
warrants, interrogation, detention, and monitoring and detention of a sus-
pect at his or her home.28  A suspect could be represented by counsel only 
after the People’s Procuratorates formally filed the criminal case in court 
 
 23. Id. (“The functional departments include the general affairs office, investigation supervi-
sion department, prosecution department, anti-embezzlement and bribery administration, [derelic-
tion] of duty and rights infringement prosecution department, prison and detention department, civil 
and administration department, reporting and charges prosecution department (also known as the 
Reporting and Charges Center of the SPP), criminal appeals department, railway transportation 
prosecution department, department for the prevention of crimes committed by taking advantage 
of one’s positions, law and policy research office, supervision bureau, foreign affairs bureau, plan-
ning, finance and equipment bureau.”). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Xiandan Huo, Legal Education and the Transformation of the Legal Profession, in 
CHINA’S JOURNEY TOWARDS THE RULE OF LAW 251, 270 (Dingjian Cai & Chenguang Wang, eds., 
2010); Yuzhong Dai, The Pursuit of Criminal Justice, in CHINA’S JOURNEY TOWARDS THE RULE 
OF LAW 155, 203 (Dingjian Cai & Chenguang Wang, eds., 2010). 
 27. See, e.g., The Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, 73 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 171, 184–89 (1982). 
 28. Zhong Liu, Reading and Interpreting Shuanggui: Informal Anticorruption Procedures 
From the Criminal Technical Investigation Perspective, 1 CHINESE & FOREIGN LEGAL STUD. 209, 
209–33 (2014), http://www.chinaelections.org/article/100/231854.html. 
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and the court accepted the case.29  In other words, the People’s Procura-
torates could investigate a suspect without dealing with his or her coun-
sel, so long as the case has not been filed and accepted.30  In addition, 
under the law, the People’s Procuratorates could declare a suspect guilty 
without formally filing the case in court.31  Where a Procuratorate has not 
obtained evidence sufficient for filing a case, this mechanism allowed it 
to bypass the courts altogether.32   
In 1996, the Party proposed, and National People’s Congress voted 
to enact, amendments that limited the People’s Procuratorates’ investiga-
tory powers and provided greater protection of defendants’ rights.33  One 
amendment limited the validity of warrants and subpoenas to twelve 
hours and forbade successive warrants and subpoenas that functionally 
allowed a suspect to be detained indefinitely.34  Another amendment pro-
vided the right to counsel after the first interrogation or “coercive meas-
ure.”35  Further, the revised law rescinded the People’s Procuratorates’ 
authority to declare a suspect guilty without court adjudication.36   
These amendments reflected the debate on the role of the criminal 
justice system, a debate that continues in China today and is in part in-
formed by traditional Chinese legal thought, which emphasizes substan-
tive justice over procedural justice.37  Within this tradition, legal proce-
dure merely provides a means for fact-finding, rather than for due 
process.38  Historically and today, China’s criminal system emphasizes 
crime control in investigation and adjudication, rather than fair process.39  
This focus stands in sharp contrast with that of criminal justice systems 
of western liberal democracies, which accept that the restrictions put in 
place to protect defendants’ rights “impose[] a substantial cost on the so-
cietal interest in law enforcement by its proscription of what concededly 
 
 29. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susongfa 2012 Xiuzheng (中华人民共和国刑事
诉讼法2012修正) [Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (2012 Amend-
ment)] (promulgated by Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 2012, effective 
Mar. 14, 2012), arts. 33, 38, 110 (China). 
 30. Liu, supra note 28, at 209–33. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Liu, supra note 28, at 209–33. 
 37. Jingjing Liu, Overview of the Chinese Legal System, 1 ENVTL.  L. REV. 1, 4 (2013). 
 38. Id. 
 39. NA JIANG, WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS IN CHINA 18–19 (2016). 
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is relevant evidence.”40  More generally, the primary purpose of the tra-
ditional Chinese legal system, as it pertains to the conduct of officials, 
was “to increase government efficiency,” rather than to protect individual 
rights or enhance the legitimacy of the exercise of government power.41 
The People’s Procuratorates began enforcing anti-corruption laws 
in 1979, following the adoption of the Criminal Law, which penalized 
conduct such as embezzlement, bribery, financial fraud, and misappro-
priation of public funds and state secrets.42  In 1979, the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate established an office on economic crimes and began inves-
tigating and prosecuting conduct involving corruption.43  In 1989, as stu-
dent activists demanded political reform, top Party leaders called for 
more enforcement of corrupt conduct, particularly of receiving bribes.44  
That same year, the Provincial People’s Procuratorate of Guangdong be-
came the first People’s Procuratorate to reorganize its economic crimes 
unit as an anti-corruption unit.45  In 1995, the Supreme People’s Procura-
torate followed suit, creating an anti-corruption bureau that prosecuted 
crimes of corruption, tax evasion, and trademark infringement.46  Since 
then, sub-national People’s Procuratorates have established their own 
anti-corruption units. 
As corruption intensified and prosecutors contended with various 
types of corrupt conduct, the anti-corruption units were further divided 
into sub-units that were separately responsible for investigating and pros-
ecuting white-collar crimes, “professional” crimes, and fraud and eco-
nomic crimes.47  For a single case involving allegations of offenses in 
multiple categories, the allegations would be investigated separately by 
the sub-units.48  Sub-division created delays in investigations. It also led 
 
 40. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448–49 (1976); see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 
U.S. 157, 166 (1986); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627 (1980). 
 41. Liu, supra note 37, at 4. 
 42. Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Jul. 1, 1979), ch. 8 (China), http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-
12/13/content_1384075.htm. 
 43. Liu, supra note 28. 
 44. Id. (citing Recent Decision of the Chinese Communist Party and State Council regarding 
Certain Items of Concern to the People (Jul. 28, 1989)). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Ye Feng, Anti-Corruption Fight by China’s Procuratorates, INDEP. COMMISSION 
AGAINST CORRUPTION, http://www.icac.org.hk/newsl/issue3/content.asp?chapter=4 (citing China 
Procuratorate Yearbook (1996), at 101–2). 
 47. China’s Thirty Year Journey in Anti-Malfeasance and Anti-Infringement, 
PROCURATORIAL DAILY NEWS (Sept. 22, 2008) http://news.china.com/zh_cn/history/all/
11025807/20080922/15099675.html. 
 48. Taking Stock of the Anti-Corruption Process: Five Steps from Discovery to Disposition, 
supra note 20.   
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to redundancy in resource and personnel that could not be effectively 
mustered across sub-units, and, even worse, fostered competition rather 
than cooperation among them.49 
The People’s Procuratorates are charged with investigating and 
prosecuting conduct penalized by the Criminal Law.  Chapter 8 of the law 
identifies some twelve crimes, such as embezzlement, misappropriating 
public funds, accepting or offering bribes, crime of property or expendi-
ture obviously exceeding one’s lawful income, and dividing  state-owned 
assets in secret.50  The units investigate and prosecute officials whose 
ranks are a level lower in the hierarchy of political organization.51  For 
example, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate investigates provincial of-
ficials and a provincial People’s Procuratorate investigates prefectural of-
ficials.  Given that the People’s Procuratorates depend on Party commit-
tees of the same level for their budget and personnel, this arrangement of 
investigating a level lower, at least in theory, promotes some measure of 
independence.52   
B. Commissions for Disciplinary Inspection 
The Commission for Disciplinary Inspection is the anti-corruption 
enforcement authority of the Chinese Communist Party.53  The Commis-
sion is an agency of the Party committee at each level of the party-state 
structure, from national to local.54  A version of the Commission for Dis-
 
 49. Michael Martina, China to Set Up New Anti-graft Office, Official Says, WORLD NEWS 
(Nov. 2, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-corruption-idUSKBN0IN07720141103. 
 50. Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 42, arts. 382–96; see Anti-
Corruption Authorities, INT’L ASS’N OF ANTI-CORRUPTION AUTHORITIES, http://www.iaaca.org/
AntiCorruptionAuthorities/ByCountriesandRegions/C/Chinajigou/201202/
t20120209_801303.shtml (last visited Aug. 16, 2016).  The Criminal Law was amended in 2015; 
in April 2016, the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate issued inter-
pretations of the law to guide enforcement.  See, e.g., China’s Supreme Court and Supreme Proc-
uratorate Issue Interpretation on Bribery Laws, DENTONS (May 16, 2016), http://www.den-
tons.com/en/insights/newsletters/2016/may/17/china-s-supreme-court-and-supreme-
procuratorate-issue-interpretation-on-bribery-laws. 
 51. Liu, supra note 28. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See generally William Wan, Secretive Agency Leads Most Intense Anti-Corruption Effort 
in Modern Chinese History, WASH. POST (Jul. 2, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/asia_pacific/secretive-agency-leads-most-intense-anti-corruption-effort-in-modern-chinese-
history/2014/07/02/48aff932-cf68-11e3-937f-d3026234b51c_story.html?tid=a_inl (last visited 
Aug. 16, 2016). 
 54. Ma, supra note 15, at 154. 
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cipline Inspection has existed since 1928; its modern incarnation was es-
tablished in 1977.55  During the Cultural Revolution that spanned the dec-
ade before its establishment, radical Party members—heeding the call of 
Chairman Mao to rid Chinese society of capitalism, the bourgeoisie, and 
traditional Chinese culture—engaged in abuse and violence against the 
Chinese citizenry across the country.56  At the end of this period of up-
heaval, moderate Party leaders came to power and created the Commis-
sion for Discipline Inspection structure to ensure discipline among Party 
members and prevent abusive conduct.57   
Beginning in the late 1980s, as economic reform led to privatization 
of state-owned enterprises and created opportunities to participate in a 
market economy, the Commissions—particularly the Central Commis-
sion—became increasingly active and high-profile as corruption intensi-
fied.58  In 1997, the report of the Central Commission to the Fifteenth 
National Congress of the Party touted Party-led anti-corruption enforce-
ment efforts.59  In 2002, the Party amended its constitution to codify the 
Commissions’ authority in anti-corruption enforcement.60   
The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection—the national 
level Party enforcement entity—has jurisdiction over officials with ranks 
of minister, vice minister, provincial governor, and vice governor, while 
the subnational commissions have jurisdiction over officials of lower 
ranks.61  The national and subnational Commissions enforce Party disci-
plinary rules against a wide range of behaviors the Party deems “unethi-
cal,” such as unauthorized business operations, profiteering, nepotism for 
self-enrichment, smuggling, obtaining bank loans through one’s office, 
 
 55. Id.; see generally Wan, supra note 53. 
 56. Ma, supra note 15, at 154; see generally Kenneth Lieberthal, Cultural Revolution, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Cultural-Revolution (last visited 
July 30, 2017). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Yang, supra note 5, at 224. 
 59. See generally The Work Report of the CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection 
to the Fifteenth National Congress of the Party, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Sept. 1997), 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64568/65445/4526295.html; see Liu, supra note 28. 
 60. Chinese Communist Party Constitution, art. 44, http://news.xinhuanet.com/18cpcnc/
2012-11/18/c_113714762_7.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2016). 
 61. See Graham Young, Control and Style: Disciplinary Inspection Commissions Since the 
11th Congress, 97 CHINA QUARTERLY, 24, 49–50 (1984), https://www.jstor.org/stable/
653913?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents; Ling Li, The Rise of the Discipline and Inspection Com-
mission, 1927–2012: Anticorruption Investigation and Decision-Making in the Chinese Communist 
Party, 42 MODERN CHINA 447, 463 (2016) (citing art. 3 of the Rules on the Jurisdiction to Approve 
Sanctions against Party Members in Violation of Party Discipline, Central Commission for Disci-
plinary Inspection, 1983). 
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misappropriation of public funds, and financial fraud.62  Prohibited con-
duct is not limited to criminalized behavior.63  Party rules also prohibit 
lavishness, womanizing, patronizing prostitutes, practicing superstition, 
being religious, privilege-seeking, and violating the one-child policy.64   
Although there are numerous Party disciplinary rules, most call for 
self-investigation, self-correction, and self-regulation.65  Enforcement is 
“sporadic” and “uneven.”66  Even when the Commissions enforce the 
rules, they are neither guided by notions of due process nor limited by 
criminal procedure, because they are entities of the Party rather than the 
legal system.67  For example, their investigators do not need a warrant to 
seize evidence or to detain individuals, even for prolonged durations.68   
Commission investigations may result in punishment against Party 
members that range from “light” to “severe.”69  In 2015, among the almost 
300,000 officials punished for graft, 200,000 received “light disciplinary 
punishments” and 82,000 were given “severe disciplinary punishments 
and major demotions.”70  Although the most severe punishment the Com-
missions could dole out is expulsion from the Party,71 the Party may direct 
a Commission to transfer the case file to the People’s Procuratorate for 
prosecution in the court system and punishment under criminal law.72 
C. The Ministry and Bureaus of Supervision 
The Ministry of Supervision enforces administrative rules that reg-
ulate the state—rather than Party—agencies, and its civil servants.73  
 
 62. Young, supra note 61, at 33–39. 
 63. Andrew Wedeman, The Intensification of Corruption in China, in CRITICAL READINGS 
ON THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, 1248, 1254–55 (Erik Brodsgaard Kjeld, ed., 2016). 
 64. Hualing Fu, The Upward and Downward Spirals in China’s Anticorruption Enforcement, 
in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CHINA 390, 395 (Mike McConville & 
Eva Pils eds., 2013) 
 65. Id. at 7. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Liu, supra note 28. 
 68. Wan, supra note 53. 
 69. Neil Connor, 300,000 Chinese Officials “Punished for Corruption” Last Year, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/12185584/
300000-Chinese-officials-punished-for-corruption-last-year.html. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See generally Wan, supra note 53. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Ministry of Supervision, CENT. PEOPLE’S GOV’T OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 
http://www.gov.cn/english/2005-10/03/content_74320.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2016). 
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When the agency was established in 1949, it was initially called the Peo-
ple’s Supervisory Commission.74  In 1954, People’s Supervisory Com-
mission was renamed the Ministry of Supervision; at sub-national levels 
the entities were renamed Bureaus of Supervision.75  Like other govern-
ment institutions, the Ministry and Bureaus were shuttered during the 
Cultural Revolution and restored afterward, in 1987.76  In 1997, the Na-
tional People’s Congress passed the Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on Administrative Supervision, which provided the Ministry juris-
diction over central government departments and its officials.77  This in-
cluded officials appointed by the State Council, the government and top 
officials of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities that are 
directly controlled by the central government.78  Meanwhile, Bureaus had 
jurisdiction over lower-ranked officials and government entities.  The 
Ministry and Bureaus may “inspect” the functioning of government units 
and the work of their officers, investigate allegations of wrongdoing, rec-
ommend sanctions, and carry out punishment.79  The Ministry also re-
views appeals by officials sanctioned by Bureaus of Supervision.80   
Functionally, there is considerable overlap in the operation of Min-
istry and Bureaus of Supervision and the Central and subnational Com-
missions for Discipline Inspection81 because nearly all government posi-
tions, including those in state-owned enterprises, are occupied by Chinese 
Communist Party members.82  Since 1992, these entities have shared of-
fices and personnel, and functioned as one in enforcing anti-corruption 
efforts.83  Because the Party has primacy over the state in the Chinese 
party-state structure, the Central and subnational Commissions control 
anti-corruption enforcement of government officials, and the Ministry 
and Bureaus of Supervision have been essentially invisible in this pro-
cess.84 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See generally id. 
 79. See generally id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Ma, supra note 15, at 154; Yong Guo, The Chinese Communist Party’s Commissions for 
Disciplinary Inspection: A Historical Overview and Future Prospects, H.K. INDEP. COMMISSION 
AGAINST CORRUPTION, CENTER FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION STUD. CONF. PROC. 212 (Apr. 2009), 
http://www.cacs.icac.hk/tc/events/files/CACS_chi_P212-225.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2016). 
 82. Chow, supra note 7, at 693. 
 83. Ma, supra note 15, at 154; Guo, supra note 81, at 212. 
 84. Guo, supra note 81, at 212. 
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III. THE ENFORCEMENT PROCESS 
Although the three institutions are formally charged with different 
missions, because the Party strongly prefers self-policing and self-regu-
lation, the Commission for Disciplinary Inspections typically leads in the 
enforcement process and directs investigations.85  Since the 1980s, when 
prosecution of “economic crimes”—the precursor to anti-corruption en-
forcement—began in earnest, Party policy has emphasized that its own 
investigators lead anti-corruption enforcement efforts.86  In 1988, the 
Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspections and the Supreme Peo-
ple’s Procuratorate established a mechanism for information sharing dur-
ing investigations and transferring cases between the agencies.87  In 1993, 
the Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspections, the Ministry of Su-
pervision, and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate agreed to enhance in-
teragency cooperation and participate in regular tripartite consultation.88  
These policies required, albeit informally, the Supreme People’s Procu-
ratorate and the sub-national People’s Procuratorates to defer to Party in-
vestigators in anti-corruption investigation.89 
In light of policies that give the Commissions the leading role in 
investigations, and the curtailment of investigatory powers from the 1996 
amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law, the Supreme People’s Proc-
uratorate adopted the policy of “coordination and support” with respect 
to Party investigations.90  On occasion, it has even interpreted this policy 
as requiring the People’s Procuratorates to suspend their investigation 
when both the Procuratorate and the Commission were investigating the 
same target.91  As a result, even where criminal conduct is involved, the 
Procuratorates often take a subordinate, supporting role to the Commis-
sions in investigations.  As this section shows, over time, “coordination” 
and “support” have become indistinct with dependence, as Procuratorates 
have come to rely on the Commissions to investigate corruption cases.   
 
 85. Guo, supra note 81, at 212, 223; Fu, supra note 64 at, 393–4; see also MIKE MCCONVILLE 
& EVA PILS, COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CHINA 398–400 (Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2013). 
 86. Liu, supra note 28, at 209–33. 
 87. Guo, supra note 81, at 223. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Liu, supra note 28. 
 90. Id. at fns. 32–34. 
 91. Fu, supra note 64, at 394. 
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A. Initiating an Investigation 
Where a Procuratorate uncovers allegations of corrupt criminal con-
duct, it typically provides the information to the Commission for Disci-
plinary Inspection at the same level in the political hierarchy.92  This is 
particularly true where high level officials are suspected of wrongdoing.93  
The Commission then decides whether to conduct an investigation.94  If 
the Commission decides to do so, it establishes a file and begins an initial 
investigation of the allegations.95  To enhance its investigatory capacity, 
the Commissions, particularly the Central Commission, may convene a 
task-force staffed by Commission investigators and employees detailed 
from other agencies, such as the Procuratorates, the police, government 
agencies relevant to the investigation, and even judges.96 
B. Party Approval 
Next, if the initial investigation corroborates the allegations, the 
Commission presents the results gathered thus far to the Party committee 
for approval to continue with the investigation.97  If a case involves a high 
ranking official, such as a leader of a province or ministry, the Central 
Commission for Disciplinary Inspection must obtain permission from the 
Politburo, an elite policymaking committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party, or for even more serious cases, the Politburo’s seven-member 
standing committee, a body composed of China’s most powerful political 
leaders.98  Commission investigators may be subject to intense pressure 
from Party leaders who do not want an investigation into their allies or 
 
 92. Liu, supra note 28; Directive on Conducting Case-Inspection Work (Central Commission 
for Disciplinary Inspection, 1988), art. 12 (China) (“The Central Commission for Discipline and 
Inspection shall conduct a preliminary verification of reports of violations for Central Committee 
members.”). From Allegations to Expulsion, What are the Stages of an Anti-Corruption Case?, 
EAST DAY (Apr. 3, 2015, 11:05 AM), http://news.eastday.com/c/20150403/u1ai8653710.html 
(noting that the Commissions for Disciplinary Inspection or Central Commission for Disciplinary 
Inspection may receive a report of allegations or uncover evidence of corruption through monitor-
ing. ) 
 93. Liu, supra note 28. 
 94. Li, supra note 61, at 464 (citing art. 3 of the Rules on the Jurisdiction to Approve Sanctions 
against Party Members in Violation of Party Discipline, Central Commission for Disciplinary In-
spection, 1983); Directive on Conducting Case-Inspection Work, supra note 92. 
 95. Directive on Conducting Case-Inspection Work, supra note 92, art. 10 (“The Commission 
shall conduct a preliminary verification of the information reflected in the report and allegations in 
has received.”). 
 96. China’s top seizure will set up a new anti-corruption bureau, RADIO FREE ASIA (Jan. 22, 
2015), www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/zhengzhi/nu-01222015101520.html; See Fu, supra 
note 64, at 398. 
 97. Liu, supra note 28, at 464. 
 98. See Wan, supra note 53. 
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themselves.99  Approval for investigations is not based solely on the 
strength of the evidence, as political factions and networks maneuver, ne-
gotiate, and even horse trade, to protect their own from further investiga-
tion.100 
C. Formal Investigation 
Once the case is “approved” by the Party committee, a formal in-
vestigation follows.101  The formal investigation may take up to two 
months and may be extended for a month.102  If the case is particularly 
complex, the Commission may seek further extensions.103  Historically, 
and still true today, anti-corruption investigations rely on interrogation as 
their primary investigatory method.104  In recent years, Commissions, par-
ticularly the Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection, have orga-
nized numerous training programs for its investigators and increasingly 
request secondment of officials of other agencies with relevant skills, 
such as data mining and forensic accounting, to assist with investiga-
tions.105  However, the Commissions and Procuratorates have not exten-
sively developed their capacity in these investigatory techniques.106 
Commission investigators have described their work during the in-
vestigatory process as “cutting off” officials from their patrons and allies 
 
 99. See id. at 4. 
 100. See id. 
 101. Li, supra note 61, at 464. 
 102. Chinese Communist Party Discipline Inspection Organs Cases Inspection Regulations, 
art. 15 PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/33838/2539632.html 
(last visited Aug. 16, 2016). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Li, supra note 61, at 467 (citing the 1994 amendment to the Central Commission for Dis-
ciplinary Inspection’s 1988 Case-Inspection Directive).  For example, when Bin Yu, a former dep-
uty mayor of Linxiang, Hunan, who had worked for Linxiang’s municipal Commission for Disci-
plinary Inspection and understood the agency’s reliance on interrogation, was prosecuted for 
corruption for receiving over RMB 400,000 in bribes, he said, “I’m too familiar with the process.  
If I don’t say anything, they won’t find anything.”  Liu, supra note 28, fn. 14 (citing “An Uncon-
ventional Deputy Mayor who Accepts Bribes to Help the Poor?,” Wenzhai Bao (Aug. 7, 2005)). 
 105. See Haoliang Ma, Beijing Observer: The Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection 
Brings New Skills from Multiple Professions to Investigations, TAKUNGPAO (Apr. 28, 2016), 
http://news.takungpao.com.hk/mainland/focus/2016-04/3312129_print.html. 
 106. Wan supra note 53.  In addition, Chinese anti-corruption investigators rarely make use of 
wiretapping or GPS tracking devices.  In fact, CCP rules ban the use of covert surveillance, such 
as wiretapping and GPS tracking devices in intra-party disciplinary investigations. These tech-
niques, if used, are only by prosecutors after a case has been transferred to the Procuratorate, and 
mainly to locate suspects rather than to collect evidence.  Li, supra note 61, at 470–71 (citing OECD 
Secretariat of the Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Effective Means 
of Investigation and Prosecution of Corruption (2010)); Lei Cheng, On the Technical Investigatory 
Power of Procuratorates, 5 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND LAW, 95, 96–97 (2011). 
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to extract information and preventing them from hiding evidence or si-
lencing others.107  To this end, Commission investigators wield “extraor-
dinarily expansive powers”108 in their authority to apply “shuanggui,” 
also referred to as “dual designation.”109  Shuanggui refers to the Com-
missions’ authority to require any individual or entity with information 
relevant to a matter being investigated to provide that information to 
Party investigators at a designated time and location.110  Because Party 
regulation considers shuanggui as separate from criminal procedure and 
“non-coercive,” the measure is not regulated by the Criminal Procedure 
Law.111  Therefore, investigators need not obtain warrants, and suspects 
and witnesses subject to shuanngui have no right to counsel.112  In addi-
tion, there is no restriction on the amount of time an individual may be 
required to stay and respond to questioning, and no limit on the number 
of mandates to appear.  The rules provide the Commissions significant 
flexibility, and nearly all questioning takes place at secret locations.113  
Despite its formal classification as “non-coercive,” shuanggui involves 
warrantless, indefinite, and secret detention of individuals “suspected of 
violating an administrative rule” and does not comport with principles of 
due process.114   
Given that one of shuanggui’s primary purposes is to extract con-
fessions from suspects, the process of “breaking down” suspects often 
involves extended detention and isolation.115  Individuals subjected to 
 
 107. Wan, supra note 53, at 4. 
 108. William Wan, How the Secretive Powerful agency in Charge of Investigating Corrupt 
Chinese Official Works, WASH. POST (Jul. 3, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/worldviews/wp/2014/07/03/how-the-communist-party-investigates-its-
own/?utm_term=.581585f2a654; Li, supra note 61, at 465. 
 109. Liu, supra note 28; Li, supra note 61, at 468; See What is Shuanggui?, APPLE DAILY (Jun. 
13, 2015), http://www.appledaily.com.tw/realtimenews/article/new/20150613/628434/. 
 110. Liu, supra note 28 (citing Chinese Communist Party Commission for Disciplinary Inspec-
tion Investigation Rules (Jan. 28, 1994)).   
 111. Id. at 12–13 (citing Chinese Communist Party Central Commission for Disciplinary In-
spection Investigation Notice (2001-1) (Jan. 20, 2000)).  Some interpret the 1996 amendments to 
the Criminal Procedure Law as effectively authorizing shuanggui.  Li, supra note 61, at 468. 
 112. Liu, supra note 28, at 5; Li, supra note 61, at 468 (noting the lack of legal assistance or 
other protections). 
 113. Liu, supra note 28, at 5; see What is Shuanggui?, supra note 109; Li, supra note 61, at 
468; Flora Sapio, Shuanggui and Extralegal Detention in China, 22 China Information 1, 7–37 
(2008). 
 114. Liu, supra note 28 (citing Legislation Law, Article 8). 
 115. Liu, supra note 28, at 5; Li, supra note 61, at 468; Notice on a Few Issues Regarding the 
Application of Shuangzhi and Shuanggui Measures by Disciplinary Institutions in Compliance with 
the Law, Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection (1998); Jianxing Wei, Guiding Principles 
and Policies on the Investigation and Handling of Cases, in ON BUILDING A CLEAN PARTY STYLE 
AND THE ANTICORRUPTION STRUGGLE (2001), available at http://dangshi.peo-
ple.com.cn/GB/146570/174891/10456272.html. 
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shuanggui have “disappeared” for months or even more than a year.116  
While under detention, suspects are watched by teams of investigators at 
all times and have no contact with others, even their attorneys.117  Further, 
some suspects have been subjected to torture.118  Wangyan Zhou, a former 
Party secretary of a municipal bureau of land and resources in Hunan, 
recounted being subjected to sleep deprivation, starvation, simulated 
drowning, beatings, and torture that left him with a fractured left leg.119  
Allegedly, some suspects have died while in detention.120  In 2013, a mu-
nicipal court official in Henan reportedly died from a heart attack after 
eleven days of detention, and a provincial bureau chief in Hubei was sent 
to the hospital unconscious and later died.121  “A disturbing number of 
officials have committed suicide rather than face the no-holds-barred in-
vestigative techniques” of the Commission.122  The scope and extent of 
these abusive practices are unclear, as data on the application of this 
measure is scant.  Nevertheless, during Xi’s administration, dozens of 
high level officials and hundreds of lower level officials have been sub-
jected to shuanggui.123  According to reports, lower level officials receive 
the most severe treatment during detention.124  Given the one-sidedness 
of the measure and the lack of protection of suspects’ rights, it is no sur-
prise that the measure has worked well for investigators and “the party 
seems to have developed a dependence on it[.]”125  In 1998, the Central 
Commission for Disciplinary Inspection and the Ministry of Supervision 
issued a joint statement lauding the efficacy of the measure.126  In 2001 
 
 116. Liu, supra note 28, at 7. 
 117. Wan, supra note 53, at 5; Li, supra note 61, at 468 (noting the lack of legal assistance or 
other protections). 
 118. Wan, supra note 53, at 5; Guoxing Cao, China Poly Group President Dong Pingchuan 
Detained to Assist with Investigation of Dongsheng Li Case, RADIO FR. INTERNATIONALE (Aug. 
1, 2014) available at http://cn.rfi.fr (last visited Aug. 16, 2016); Sapio, supra note 113, at 16–20. 
 119. See Yongming Qi, Tortured Chinese Official Explains His Suffering During Shuanggui, 
VOICE OF AM. (Mar. 10, 2014, 9:12 PM), http://www.voachinese.com/content/china-abused-offi-
cial-20140308/1867178.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2016); see also Detention Deaths in Chinese 
Corruption Cases Stir Concern, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 21, 2013), http://cn.nytimes.com/
china/20130621/c21shuanggui (last visited Aug. 16, 2016). 
 120. Nancy Tang et al., China’s Rule by Law Takes an Ugly Turn, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jul. 14, 
2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/14/chinas-rule-by-law-takes-an-ugly-turn-rights-lawyers-
crackdown-xi-jinping; Sapio, supra note 113, at 20. 
 121. Detention Deaths in Chinese Corruption Cases Stir Concern, supra note 120. 
 122. Wan, supra note 53, at 5; Tang et al., supra note 121, at 8. 
 123. See Qi, supra note 120; see also Detention Deaths in Chinese Corruption Cases Stir Con-
cern, supra note 120. 
 124. See id.; Tang et al., supra note 121. 
 125. Li, supra note 61, at 469. 
 126. Liu, supra note 28 (citing Chinese Communist Party Central Commission for Disciplinary 
Inspection Investigation Rules Implementing Details (Mar. 25, 1994)). 
TECH TO EIC (DO NOT DELETE) 8/28/2017  1:45 PM 
2017] Who Enforces China’s Anti-corruption Laws? 155 
and 2005, the Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection issued 
other notices encouraging its investigators to use the measure.127 
In contrast, the People’s Procuratorates are constrained by laws and 
rules of criminal procedure.  Arrest requires “evidence to support the facts 
of a crime” and is subject to other limitations and considerations such as 
the likelihood of committing additional crimes, destruction of evidence, 
or intimidation of witnesses.128  The time limit for holding a criminal sus-
pect in custody during an investigation is two months, although it may be 
extended subject to approval; residential surveillance detention is limited 
to six months.129  In addition, interrogation by Procuratorate investigators 
must take place in the city or county where the suspect resides,130 whereas 
the Party’s rules on shuanggui allow for holding suspects in secret, fara-
way locations.131  Shuanggui has “not only made the Central Commission 
for Discipline and Inspection the most powerful specialized anticorrup-
tion institution of the party-state, but also made the Party disciplinary sys-
tem the Party’s most forceful instrument for consolidating its power.”132 
D. Party Adjudication 
After the formal investigation is complete, Commission investiga-
tors prepare a written report stating the initial allegations, the main inves-
tigatory findings, the nature of any violation, attitude of the accused to-
ward the wrongful conduct, and suggestion for sanctions.133  The report is 
provided to the leadership of the Commission, who determines whether 
the case would be sent to the Commission’s case-examination depart-
ment, which appraises the evidence for clarity of the facts, sufficiency 
and certainty of the evidence, accuracy of the characterization of the case, 
and propriety of the sanctions, and provides another written report.134  
 
 127. Id.; see also Notice on a Few Issues Regarding the Application of Shuangzhi and 
Shuanggui Measures by Disciplinary Institutions in Compliance with the Law, supra note 116; 
Notice on the Correct Application of Shuanggui and Shuangzhi Measures (promulgated by the 
Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection, 2001) (China); Opinions on Perfecting the Coor-
dination Mechanism in Case Investigation and Handling and Further Improving and Normalizing 
the Application of Shuanggui (promulgated by the Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection, 
2005) (China). 
 128. The Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, arts. 78–79 (amended 
Mar. 14, 2012). 
 129. Id. arts. 77, 154, 156, 157, 158 (amended Mar. 14, 2012). 
 130. Id. art. 116; see Liu, supra note 28 (citing Regulation on Detention Facilities (Mar. 17, 
1990)). 
 131. Liu, supra note 28 (citing Chinese Communist Party Central Commission for Disciplinary 
Inspection and Ministry of Supervision Joint Notice Regarding Dual Designation (Jun. 5, 1998)). 
 132. Li, supra note 61, at 467. 
 133. Id. at 465. 
 134. Id. 
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Based on the final report, the Commission’s leadership signs off on the 
proposed punishment.135  In practice, this approval process is often under-
taken with guidance from Party committees.136  Although the Commis-
sion for Disciplinary Inspection conducts this review following a formal 
investigation, there is a prevailing perception that, if a formal investiga-
tion is authorized, the patrons of the political networks have “given up” 
on the official under suspicion, and liability is likely.137  The review takes 
place in a secret proceeding within the Commission; neither the suspect 
nor his or her attorney or advocate is allowed to attend or review the ev-
idence.138  Although those found liable for violating Party rules may ap-
peal, no case has been overturned.139 
E. Prosecution and Court Adjudication 
If the investigation yields evidence of criminal conduct, the Com-
mission may transfer the case to the People’s Procuratorate for prosecu-
tion.140  However, the Party’s involvement is not limited by the transfer 
of the case.  For one, the results of Commission-led investigations typi-
cally form the basis of the prosecution’s case.141  In addition, after the file 
is formally transferred to the People’s Procuratorate, the Party may in-
struct the agency on its handling the case,142 such as whether to charge the 
individual, which crimes to charge, what evidence to present at trial, and 
even what sentence to seek.  For example, in the prosecution of Zhou 
Yongkang, a former top Party leader who was a member of the Politboro 
Standing Committee and the Minister of Public Security, the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate appeared to follow instructions based on a com-
promise between competing political factions in the sentence sought, and 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 455, 457–59 (citing Art. 44 of the Party Charter as amended in 1982); see Young, 
supra note 61, at 49–50. 
 137. See Wan, supra note 53. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. From Allegations to Expulsion, What are the Stages of an Anti-Corruption Case? supra 
note 92. 
 141. Liu, supra note 28; Fu, supra note 64, at 397–99. 
 142. Yishan Jing, To Combat Corruption in Accordance with the Law, the New Anti-Corrup-
tion Agency Needs a Boost, BEIJING DAILY NEWS (Nov. 6, 2014), available at http://opinion.peo-
ple.com.cn/n/2014/1106/c1003-25985282.html; see XIAO YANG, ANTI-CORRUPTION REPORT: 
THE BIRTH OF THE FIRST ANTI-CORRUPTION ADMINISTRATION IN THE REPUBLIC 135 (Beijing 
Law Press, 2008); Fu, supra note 64, at 397–99; see China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign Is Not All 
It Seems, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2ebe2150-1970-11e4-8730-
00144feabdc0. 
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Zhou received a sentence of life in prison rather than the death penalty.143  
Where Procuratorate officials fail to follow instructions, they are often 
reprimanded for “competing with the Party Committee” or “objecting to 
Party leadership.”144  The Party’s involvement is based on not only the 
Party’s desire to control legal institutions, but also the principle that in 
China’s party-state system, the enforcement of law by the People’s Proc-
uratorates “interferes” with the Party’s management of its personnel.145 
F. Implications 
As the process described above has become the norm, the People’s 
Procuratorates have initiated fewer corruption cases, and more than 80% 
of cases are investigated by the Commissions for Disciplinary Inspec-
tion.146  Party control over enforcement is even more pronounced for cases 
involving higher ranking officials.147  This phenomenon, which reflects 
the People’s Procuratorates’ policy of depending on the Commission in 
investigations, has two implications.  First, Procuratorates turn to the 
Commissions for political cover, as anti-corruption enforcement in China 
is an arena fraught with struggle between political factions, and corrup-
tion charges have been “used to justify the expulsion of low-ranking ca-
dres or senior officials who had lost internal power struggles.”148  Second, 
the Procuratorates’ dependence on Commission-led investigations allows 
them to use evidence obtained from shuanggui and thus skirt the re-
strictions of the Criminal Procedure Law.149   
IV. RECENT REFORMS OF THE PEOPLE’S PROCURATORATES 
Two important reforms in the past few years aim to reduce the de-
pendence of the People’s Procuratorates on Commissions of Disciplinary 
Inspections in anti-corruption enforcement.  The first is a set of amend-
ments to the Criminal Procedure Law that expanded the Procuratorates’ 
 
 143. Xin Gao, Xi Jinping Does Not Ask Zhou Yongkang to Surrender; Zhou Returns the Favor 
by Agreeing Not to Appeal, RADIO FREE ASIA (Jun. 16, 2015) available at 
http://www.rfa.org/mandarin/zhuanlan/yehuazhongnanhai/gx-06162015125204.html (last visited 
Aug. 16, 2016). 
 144. XIAO supra note 144; Fu, supra note 64, at 397–99. 
 145. Liu, supra note 28.   
 146. Fu, supra note 64, at 395. 
 147. Id.; Chow, supra note 7, at 687–9 (The Chinese Communist Party has increasingly con-
trolled the investigation and punishment of senior officials.). 
 148. Wan supra note 53 at 1; see also Gao, supra note 145. 
 149. See Qi, supra note 120; see also Detention Deaths in Chinese Corruption Cases Stir Con-
cern, supra note 120; Liu supra note 28 (noting that some contend the practice of shuanggui vio-
lates China’s 2000 Legislation Law, which requires deprivations of personal liberty and other co-
ercive and penalogical measures to be governed by law. (citing Legislation Law, art. 8)). 
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investigatory powers.  The second is the consolidation of anti-corruption 
enforcement units within the Supreme People’s Procuratorate into a new 
agency.  At least in theory, both reforms increase the efficacy of the Proc-
uratorates.  However, whether the People’s Procuratorates ultimately 
function as an assertive legal counterpart to the Commissions depends on 
whether the Chinese Communist Party relinquishes its penchant for self-
regulation and control.   
A. Enhancement of Investigatory Power   
In 2012, the National People’s Congress amended the Criminal Pro-
cedure Law to strengthen the detention powers of the People’s Procura-
torates.150  As amended, article 73 sets forth three categories of suspects, 
including those accused of “major corruption,” and further authorizes the 
People’s Procuratorates to order major corruption suspects to “reside” 
and remain, for up to six months, at a specific location and be subject to 
continuous monitoring.151  This measure differs from shuanggui in a few 
important ways.152  First, to apply this measure, the Procuratorate must 
seek the approval from the People’s Court.153  Second, a detained suspect 
or defendant may meet and correspond with his or her attorney and the 
meetings are not monitored by investigators.154  Moreover, unlike those 
detained by the Commissions of Disciplinary Inspection, suspects de-
tained by the Procuratorates generally are not removed to undisclosed lo-
cations.155  Instead, suspects generally remain at home where they are 
monitored, unless detention at one’s home impedes investigation.156   
 
 150. See Di Wu Shiwu Hao, Decision of the National People’s Congress on Amending the 
Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, CENT. PEOPLE’S GOV’T OF THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2012-03/15/con-
tent_2092191.htm. 
 151. Diyan Feng, Investigation on the residence system of the designated residence in the in-
vestigation of bribery cases by the procuratorial organs, JUST. NETWORK (Jul. 16, 2012), 
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The amendments aim to empower prosecutors.  Following the 
amendments, some local People’s Procuratorates—particularly those at 
the municipal and county levels—have made effective use of the newly-
available measure and reduced their dependence on Party investigators.157  
This appears to be true especially where the local Commission for Disci-
plinary Inspection is unwilling to investigate local officials, or where the 
official suspected of wrongdoing is of relatively low rank and is therefore 
of little interest to the central Party investigators.  Where Party investiga-
tors are unwilling to act, local People’s Procuratorates may find greater 
“space” for action and draw on their expanded investigatory power. 
However, to those critical of Chinese anti-corruption enforcement’s 
reliance on detention and interrogation, this amendment provides for a 
version of shuanggui for the People’s Procuratorates.158  They argue that 
the amendment fails to define statutory terms, such as what constitutes 
“major” cases, and that the lack of specification leaves room for abuse.  
Some observers note that suspects held under “designated residential sur-
veillance” are “in practice . . . held under solitary confinement” and the 
law does not prevent confinement in unknown locations.159  Indeed, 
“[t]his kind of detention amounts to enforced disappearance and is con-
ducive to the use of torture.”160 
Further, the expansion of detention power potentially spurs People’s 
Procuratorates to continue to rely on detention and interrogation, rather 
than on strengthening other investigatory techniques that involve a lesser 
degree of deprivation of personal liberty.  The Procuratorates’ investiga-
tory technology lags behind that used by China’s police or state security 
agencies.161  This deficiency specifically affects anti-corruption investi-
gations, because even though the People’s Procuratorates prosecute 
crimes, under China’s Criminal Procedure Law, there is a division of la-
bor in the investigation of crimes.162  In general, the police investigates 
street crimes, and the People’s Procuratorates investigate crimes of em-
bezzlement, bribery, dereliction of duty, and crimes involving violations 
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of a citizen’s personal rights, such as illegal detention, extortion of con-
fessions by torture, retaliation, and illegal search.163 Prosecutors note that 
anti-corruption investigations by local People’s Prosecutorates are often 
hampered by the time-consuming process of gathering of basic infor-
mation from various sources, and a shared database of information on 
property, bank accounts, and business registration would greatly speed 
up investigations.164  
B. Consolidation of Anti-Corruption Units 
The second set of reforms addresses the fragmentation of anti-cor-
ruption enforcement capacity within the Supreme People’s Procuratorate.  
In late 2014, the National People’s Congress adopted legislation to create 
a new anti-corruption enforcement agency within the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate called the anti-bribery bureau.  The law provided for the 
consolidation of three units—the anti-bribery bureau, the malfeasance 
and infringement office, and the dereliction of duty office165—to reduce 
redundancy and fragmentation of resources and capacity from having 
three separate units.166  In addition, the reform elevated the rank of the 
agency’s head to “vice-minister.”167  This change enhanced the prestige 
and power of the new agency within the Supreme People’s Procuratorate 
and, to a certain extent, vis-à-vis Party investigators.168 
The reform attempts to address “[a] lack of efficiency, inadequate 
personnel and resources, and weak coordination” that has plagued the 
anti-corruption units in the Supreme People’s Procuratorate.169  The con-
solidated agency could better muster staff and resources that were previ-
ously housed in separate units.  Also, it could provide guidance more ef-
ficiently to local People’s Procuratorates and avoid conflicting 
instructions.170  Because of the volume of corruption cases, and given that 
the Supreme People’s Procuratorate often has to overcome its staffing 
and resource constraints by working with local People’s Procuratorates, 
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police, banks, and other institutions, a consolidated anti-corruption 
agency could better coordinate investigations than the fragmented sub-
units.171  Further, with greater authority and more capacity, the newly-
created agency could better take on higher-stakes, larger, and more com-
plex cases172—such as those involving senior officials or officials in sec-
tors with powerful political networks, such as construction, real estate, 
and infrastructure development—that have caused significant losses to 
government coffers.173   
A stronger national-level anti-corruption prosecuting office could 
become “the main force of anti-corruption investigations.”174  Many were 
hopeful that anti-corruption enforcement would be led by an agency 
rooted in the law and criminal procedure and committed to transpar-
ency,175 in sharp contrast to enforcement by the Central Commission for 
Disciplinary Inspection, which has become “more opaque, more secre-
tive, and less rule-bound.”176  Initial results indicate that following the 
reorganization in 2015, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate conducted 
more investigations.  That year, the agency investigated 54,249 officials, 
and among those, 41 were senior level officials, up from 28 in 2014.177 
Although the reform aims to create a national-level anti-corruption 
agency that is better able to provide guidance to local prosecutors, the 
reform does not address many of the challenges in anti-corruption en-
forcement at the local level, such as limited investigatory powers and per-
sonnel.178  However, the reform may encourage local People’s Procurato-
rates to experiment with institutional reform.  In fact, successful local 
innovation often has formed the basis for national level reform.  Back in 
January 2002, municipal-level prosecutors in Chongqing created a bureau 
to handle both official corruption and malfeasance cases, and a year later 
People’s Procuratorates at all levels in Chongqing consolidated their anti-
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corruption units.179  The People’s Procuratorates in Tianjin and in some 
districts of Shenzhen and Shenyang followed with similar changes.180  
The creation of the anti-bribery bureau of the Supreme People’s Procura-
torate can be seen as affirming the success of these local experiments.  
Nevertheless, despite institutional innovations, the number of cases pros-
ecuted nationwide by local People’s Procuratorates have remained rela-
tively stable—approximately 35,000 to 39,000 per year in the past dec-
ade—which scholars point to as indication that local prosecution has not 
been able to keep up with rampant corruption.181  More resources, in ad-
dition to guidance and support by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, 
are needed.182 
Despite the shortcomings, the 2014 reforms of the anti-corruption 
unit in the Supreme People’s Procuratorate were hailed as enhancing a 
countervailing investigative authority—one that is rooted in the law—to 
the Party’s anti-corruption investigative apparatus.  This is because, be-
ginning in 2012, the Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection has 
undergone its own reforms that expanded its enforcement capacity.183  In 
those reforms, the Central Commission added four inspection offices,184 
developed a set of standard procedures to handle investigations of local 
corruption,185 and assigned teams of Party investigators, who now total 
over a hundred, to monitor high-ranking officials in specific ministries or 
provinces.186  These enhancements have made the Central Commission 
for Discipline Inspection a more powerful entity not only vis-à-vis its lo-
cal counterparts, many of which are paralyzed by political capture, but 
also as to the People’s Procuratorates.187  The Central Commission’s 
added capacity to investigate local corruption has cultivated a practice 
among subnational Commissions of referring complex or politically sen-
sitive cases to the Central Commission, to avoid pressure from local Party 
committees.188  Given that this practice centralizes anti-corruption en-
forcement activity in the Central Commission, it discourages the People’s 
Procuratorates from initiating cases, perpetuating the dynamics of Party 
“self-regulation.”189 
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C. China’s Formalistic Rule of Law 
Recent reforms of the People’s Procuratorates are consistent with 
the trajectory of the development of China’s legal system in the past few 
decades, during which the party-state has embarked on a project of de-
veloping formal legal institutions.190  Since 1976, the National People’s 
Congress and its Standing Committee have passed more than 337 laws, 
and local governments have adopted more than 6,000 regulations.191  In 
the past decade, China’s courts handled cases that numbered in the mil-
lions each year.192  In addition, by 2011, a mere quarter century since Chi-
nese law schools re-opened following the Cultural Revolution, licensed 
lawyers in China exceeded 200,000.193  With these legal institutions in 
place, many scholars would characterize China’s legal system as pos-
sessing the formalistic, instrumental aspects of the law, such as statutes 
and regulations, courts, judges, and a legal profession.194  Although the 
party-state issues laws, regulations, and policies,195 one of the key char-
acteristics of the Chinese system is the Party’s resistance to checks on its 
power.196  That is, China’s legal system operates in a political context in 
which the Party holds as paramount the primacy of its authority and con-
tinuation of its rule.  In the past decade, concerns about social unrest, 
which may threaten the Party’s rule, have led Party leaders to incorporate 
political-legal institutions into a “system-wide stability maintenance net-
work.”197  For example, the Party has enhanced the efficiency of Chinese 
courts to handle large numbers of lawsuits, thereby addressing the need 
for dispute resolution and reducing the number of grievances that could 
turn into demonstrations or protests.198  In addition, in propounding cer-
tain organizing principles in its legal system, the Party has emphasized 
collective rights over individual rights,199 and extolled the primacy Party 
 
 190. See Ben Self, The Bo Xilai Trial and China’s Struggle with the Rule of Law, 14 WASH. U. 
GLOBAL. STUD. L. REV. 155, 165 (2015); RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH 
TOWARD RULE OF LAW 8 (Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
 191. PEERENBOOM, supra note 192, at 6. 
 192. Id. at 7. 
 193. Xinhua, Number of China’s Licensed Lawyers Reaches 200,000, PEOPLE’S DAILY (Oct. 
19, 2011), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90882/7620752.html. 
 194. See generally PEERENBOOM, supra note 192, at 3, 6. 
 195. Rules of the Party, ECONOMIST (Nov. 1, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/china/
21629528-call-revive-countrys-constitution-will-not-necessarily-establish-rule-law-rules; Zhong 
Wu, China’s Fearsome Jiwei Take on Graft, ASIA TIMES (Jun. 9, 2010), http://www.atimes.com/
atimes/China/LF09Ad01.html. 
 196. Tang, et al., supra note 121 at 4. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Benjamin Liebman, China’s Courts: Restricted Reform, 21 COLUMBIA J. OF ASIAN L., 2, 
4 (2007). 
 199. PEERENBOOM, supra note 192 at 4. 
FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/28/2017  1:45 PM 
164 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 40:2 
leadership.200  Through these measures, the Party has signaled its aim “to 
strengthen the law to make the Party more powerful.” 201 
D. Policy and Prospects of Retrenchment   
Viewed in the context of the Chinese party-state, although the re-
forms seek to enhance the capacity of the People’s Procuratorates in anti-
corruption enforcement, they do not address the observation that the Chi-
nese Communist Party prefers to regulate itself, rather than submit to “le-
gal supervision.”202 
Chinese Communist Party members control political and economic 
power in China, occupying most of the positions of power in the govern-
ment, the security apparatus, and state-owned enterprises.  Although 
Party leaders are concerned with the existence of rampant corruption, 
they also worry about the publicity of rampant corruption.203  This latter 
concern underpins the reluctance to strengthen the People’s Procurato-
rates’ role in anti-corruption enforcement.  The reasons are mainly two-
fold.  First, some Party leaders are uneasy with the expansion of prosecu-
torial power because the People’s Procuratorates operate more 
transparently than Party investigators and information about investiga-
tions and the results of prosecutions are more likely to be made public.204  
Second, some Party leaders prefer that the Party—rather than the law—
impose punishment on offending members.205  This preference is based 
on the view that the Party is the ultimate source of power in China’s party-
state system.  It also forms the basis of an informal Party rule that pre-
vents Party members from being prosecuted for corruption in court, and 
requires the Party expel the member before the People’s Procuratorate 
could prosecute the individual.206  Through this informal policy, the Party 
effectively controls whether the People’s Procuratorates can conduct cor-
ruption prosecutions, and substitutes Party discipline for law enforce-
ment.207   
Also essential to understanding recent reforms in context is the fact 
that the Party continues to maintain control over the prosecutors’ offices 
and resists relinquishing that control.  The reforms did not change the fact 
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that, at all levels, Party committees and governments “supervise” the Peo-
ple’s Procuratorates and control their budget.208  This institutional ar-
rangement exposes prosecutors to resistance and interference in their 
anti-corruption investigations.209  In addition, after the 2014 reforms to 
enhance prosecutor capacity, a more recent policy signaled a retrench-
ment of prosecutor authority.  In November 2016, the General Office of 
the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee issued the “Decision 
on Carrying Out Pilot Projects of the National Procurator System,” which 
directed the People’s Congresses of three test sites, Beijing, Shanxi, and 
Zhejiang, to create unified “Supervision Commissions” comprised of the 
anti-corruption prosecutors and Party investigators.210  These Supervision 
Commissions would carry out corruption investigations and, following 
their completion, transfer cases with evidence of criminal conduct to the 
People’s Procuratorates for prosecution.211  Observers predict, under the 
new institutional arrangement, Commissions of Disciplinary Inspection 
investigators would dominate the Supervision Commissions.212  As im-
plementation began in late December 2016, when the Standing Commit-
tee of the National People’s Congress approved the Decision, few details 
on the results of the pilot projects are available.213  Nevertheless, even if 
only in broad strokes, the policy sets forth a vision for an institutional 
arrangement in which the anti-corruption investigatory functions in the 
People’s Procuratorate would be moved to a new entity and under the 
control of the Party.214 
Even if this policy merely formalizes the reality of the current anti-
corruption enforcement process, in which the Commissions lead and 
Procuratorates follow, it comes after successive reforms to enhance pros-
ecutorial capacity and initiative, and signals a remarkable reversal.  The 
formal removal of the investigatory functions of the People’s Procurato-
rates in corruption cases nearly ensures that only the Party can initiate 
anti-corruption investigations.  The policy confirms the Party’s penchant 
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for self-policing and self-regulation, and illustrates the Party’s uneasy re-
lationship with any institution that serves as a check on its power. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The legitimacy and authoritativeness of anti-corruption enforcement 
depend not only on the punishment of illicit conduct but also on the fair-
ness and evenhandedness of the enforcement process, as goals of detec-
tion and deterrence are balanced with the rights of defendants.  This anal-
ysis of the process of anti-corruption enforcement in China shows that 
the People’s Procuratorates have a tenuous role in supervising the Party.  
After reforms that enhanced the capacity of the People’s Procuratorates 
and expanded its investigatory powers, the Party has sought to reassert 
control.  The recent series of reforms affecting China’s anti-corruption 
prosecutors confirms that, despite the country’s rapid legal development 
in the past few decades, its legal system remains formalistic, and the Party 
continues to operate beyond the rule of law. 
 
